Today I came across a write up on the disengagement of Chinese forces, in Galwan valley. The author of the write-up heaped a lot of praises on Modi, which is agreeable but in the end, he talked about the failure of the government in 1962. Agreed this is a democracy, he is entitled to have his opinion, I welcome it. We can hardly expect an objective analysis from a Modi bhakt.
In reversing the image of India from the Nehruvian era, our PM aggressively highlighted his Foreign Policy, which has been built on hugplomacy and charisma, which is good for optics, but not for diplomacy, and especially not for China, which can not be bracketed with anybody. The fact of the matter is that we have failed to read China. Our PM visited China before becoming PM and as PM around 5 times in the last 6 years, total about 18 times he had meetings with Chinese PM, latest being Mamillapuram in Tamilnadu, and we have tried to please them by making many compromises, but all this didn’t work, and I don’t understand why the Border issues did not get frozen. Instead, we are getting intimidated, and if someone feels it’s great handling. I leave it to each person's wisdom. Our eastern neighbour continues to be as inscrutable as it was in 1962. If Nehru nurtured a romantic notion of civilisational loyalties, Modiji, graduated that to a shared sense of Asian leadership, one which saw even more Chinese investments in India and mounting trade deficit.
Coming back to the issue, the disengagement may be music to the ears but Chinese maneuvers are difficult to anticipate and hard to believe.
I'm curious to know if the claims of Chinese troops infiltrated deep into Indian territory already, then does this retreat mean anything at all?
Nehru, when China encroached he had the guts to call the parliament and make a statement, on the floor of the House, and didn’t conceal the facts. Now its a bit puzzling as well because if the PLA can pull back after just a phone call from Mr. Dowal, why was China allowed in the first place to breach LAC resulting in loss of 20 soldiers? Why was not NSA engaged in dialogue when tensions were mounting? However, it’s now amply clear that PLA did breach the LAC.
There is an uncanny resemblance between what is going on now on the India-China border with events in the run-up to the 1962 war. The debacle in the war was rightly blamed on the Nehru government, for its military unpreparedness. But now India is in a much better position to face china’s challenges, the situation in terms of the military equation is never the same as in 1962. In both cases, New Delhi failed to fully understand fundamental strategic objectives regarding India. Nehru could be impugned for his idealistic notion of Afro-Asian solidarity and his suspicion of America’s strategic designs that influenced his thinking on China, but present government whose foreign policy actions are transactional rather than idealistic considerations, seems to be equally naive about Beijing's long term strategic objectives. New Delhi has compounded its failure by indulging in reckless rhetoric regarding Aksaichin and POK. A senior cabinet minister’s declaration about liberating Aksaichin and recovering POK, while justifiable in terms of India’s legal rights to these territories, was ill-timed. This rhetoric coupled with few other issues could be the reason for the fiasco.
Most importantly PM should keep everything transparent, with a hawk’s eye on PLA movements, and use Parliament to keep the opposition and the nation abreast of developments. Silence would be interpreted as appeasement, something Chinese love to feed on.
In reversing the image of India from the Nehruvian era, our PM aggressively highlighted his Foreign Policy, which has been built on hugplomacy and charisma, which is good for optics, but not for diplomacy, and especially not for China, which can not be bracketed with anybody. The fact of the matter is that we have failed to read China. Our PM visited China before becoming PM and as PM around 5 times in the last 6 years, total about 18 times he had meetings with Chinese PM, latest being Mamillapuram in Tamilnadu, and we have tried to please them by making many compromises, but all this didn’t work, and I don’t understand why the Border issues did not get frozen. Instead, we are getting intimidated, and if someone feels it’s great handling. I leave it to each person's wisdom. Our eastern neighbour continues to be as inscrutable as it was in 1962. If Nehru nurtured a romantic notion of civilisational loyalties, Modiji, graduated that to a shared sense of Asian leadership, one which saw even more Chinese investments in India and mounting trade deficit.
Coming back to the issue, the disengagement may be music to the ears but Chinese maneuvers are difficult to anticipate and hard to believe.
I'm curious to know if the claims of Chinese troops infiltrated deep into Indian territory already, then does this retreat mean anything at all?
Nehru, when China encroached he had the guts to call the parliament and make a statement, on the floor of the House, and didn’t conceal the facts. Now its a bit puzzling as well because if the PLA can pull back after just a phone call from Mr. Dowal, why was China allowed in the first place to breach LAC resulting in loss of 20 soldiers? Why was not NSA engaged in dialogue when tensions were mounting? However, it’s now amply clear that PLA did breach the LAC.
There is an uncanny resemblance between what is going on now on the India-China border with events in the run-up to the 1962 war. The debacle in the war was rightly blamed on the Nehru government, for its military unpreparedness. But now India is in a much better position to face china’s challenges, the situation in terms of the military equation is never the same as in 1962. In both cases, New Delhi failed to fully understand fundamental strategic objectives regarding India. Nehru could be impugned for his idealistic notion of Afro-Asian solidarity and his suspicion of America’s strategic designs that influenced his thinking on China, but present government whose foreign policy actions are transactional rather than idealistic considerations, seems to be equally naive about Beijing's long term strategic objectives. New Delhi has compounded its failure by indulging in reckless rhetoric regarding Aksaichin and POK. A senior cabinet minister’s declaration about liberating Aksaichin and recovering POK, while justifiable in terms of India’s legal rights to these territories, was ill-timed. This rhetoric coupled with few other issues could be the reason for the fiasco.
Most importantly PM should keep everything transparent, with a hawk’s eye on PLA movements, and use Parliament to keep the opposition and the nation abreast of developments. Silence would be interpreted as appeasement, something Chinese love to feed on.
